Ukraine’s Upstream Capability
William George and Patrick Hinton | 2023.03.01
As territory, towns and cities captured at great cost are liberated, there are numerous reasons why Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is experiencing ongoing struggles. These span the levels of conflict and range from strategic miscalculation and a centralised command structure inherently unable to adapt and react to poorly conceived and executed operational plans to tactical errors.
The tenacity of Ukraine’s troops has been buoyed by an influx of modern weaponry from NATO and the West since the Russian invasion began in February 2022. But preceding these important imports was a coherent package of support to the Ukrainian defence and security sector from the UK and its allies, which began in 2014 and – at the time of writing – appears to represent a successful case of upstream capacity building and investment that contrasts sharply with the chaotic collapse of Western support in Afghanistan. Does such an approach provide a model for future defence engagement activity or is there a danger of drawing premature conclusions from an ongoing war? And do we risk being too selfcongratulatory by linking our support with the successes of those unified in their fight for the survival of Ukraine as a nation state?
Perhaps the first question to consider though is why the British Army should occupy itself with such endeavours? The answer to which should be relatively fresh in Western military minds – capacity building aims to avoid the messy outcomes often associated with peacekeeping and stabilisation operations. As Nilsson and Zetterlund write: “Fragile countries are to be strengthened so that they can shoulder their own problems, thereby reducing the need for international assistance”. The paradigm of capacity building is not without issue. It is poorly defined and can range from a short, simple training course in a specific skill through to a multi-departmental effort orchestrated over months or years with significant resource. It can span a broad spectrum of activities – from short-term training teams through to institutional reform. The selection of the capacity to be built is important. Indeed, “building the ‘wrong’ capacity or strengthening the ‘wrong’ actors might make a conflict even worse”. Capacity building is similar to security force assistance, although is generally considered to have a wider remit where force footprints are small and often focused on basic tactical training.
POST-CRIMEA COMMITMENT
The expansion of the UK’s commitment to the development of Ukraine’s defence and security sector began in earnest after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. There were two significant strands to this: Operation Orbital – the provision of training and support to the Ukrainian armed forces (primarily in the land domain) and assistance, afforded to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and wider government, in implementing security sector reforms. In summary, the blend of tactical training and equipping the Ukrainian armed forces was paired with the longerterm institutional changes required at the operational and strategic levels. These efforts complemented both the NATO-led assistance to the country as an enhanced NATO partner nation and unilateral engagement. Ukraine has been part of the US National Guard State Partnership programme since 1993. This offers, among other training opportunities, low level non-commissioned officer leadership training. The surge of the UK efforts since 2014 came during a period of increased focus on what the Chief of the General Staff at the time outlined as defence engagement, one pillar of which was the development of regional capacity to enable security concerns to be dealt with by their respective regional governments. This built on concepts first articulated in the Strategic Defence and Security Review in 2010, which viewed Defence playing a key role in early, upstream capacity building to preventthe causes of conflict.
“Operation Orbital deployed in 2015 with a focus on training, mentoring and advising local military personnel and with the intent to improve the capacity and capability of the Ukrainian armed forces on a sustainable basis.”
Following a similar model to previous training missions (including in Afghanistan), Operation Orbital deployed in 2015 with a focus on training, mentoring and advising local military personnel and with the intent to improve the capacity and capability of the Ukrainian armed forces on a sustainable basis. By February of last year, more than 22,000 Ukrainian troops had received British training. A subsequent focus on planning, operations and low-level leadership assisted in the development of a cadre of well trained, tactically astute officers and soldiers capable of planning coherent military activity at the tactical level supported by and set within an operational framework. This was in tandem with NATO and other unilateral support to Ukraine, with multi-national training teams regular visitors to the country.
Concurrently, pre-dating the recommendations of the Integrated Review, Operation Orbital was enhanced by UK support to theUkrainian Ministry of Defence and other government departments to drive security sector reform and improve areas such as procurement that had previously been open to corruption. The increased workload in Ukraine was supported by a reinforced defence section, employed within the embassy in Kyiv, further improving and exploiting efforts from the Ministry of Defence, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and partners across government. This encapsulated the all-encompassing, whole of government approach to national security later detailed in the 2021 Integrated Review. It is partly this exploitation of existing synergies of the work completed by partners across government that have made the capacity building in Ukraine a comparative success and potentially a useful model for further upstream projects.
WHAT LESSONS CAN WE LEARN?
The models currently in use for engagement activity (such as the Methods of Effect model) place the emphasis on what activity we will undertake in a given country and how we measure its effectiveness. There is less attention paid to the underlying suitability of a country or understanding if the model used is the correct one for the circumstances prevalent in that country. The war in Ukraine has been one of national survival with the majority of society united in its determination to expel the Russian invaders, a unifying factor that has undoubtedly played a significant part in the defence of their homeland. The fight has been in many ways a conventional, metal-on-metal battle rather than a counter-insurgency conflict (as some commentators considered it would develop into). The government and military have acted in tandem with a united and obvious intent, and Ukraine has welcomed efforts to develop its capacity and supported them internally. In previous upstream capacity building efforts this has not always been the case, with the Clausewitzian trinity of the political, the military and the public bodies divided and disconnected.
“The government and military have acted in tandem with a united and obvious intent, and Ukraine has welcomed efforts to develop its capacity and supported them internally. In previous upstream capacity building efforts this has not always been the case.”
Logistics have also been relatively straightforward. For the UK and many other European nations, it has been comparatively simple to move massed materiel across the Continent – although this supply chain is now being severely tested as the battle continues. The unity of the Ukrainian response and the country’s relative proximity should not, however, detract from what has been a coherent, layered and connected example of defence overseas engagement working to develop capacity and capability.
Of course, if the aim of upstream capacity building is delivering sustainable peace and stability, then it could be argued that the evolution of the Crimea crisis into a wider, conventional war suggests that international endeavours in Ukraine have been in vain. To do so would be harsh, given the Kremlin’s true intent towards Ukraine has gained significant clarity since 2014 and the limited options open to dissuade Putin from his current course, and should not deter the UK from continued investment in capacity building across the globe. Equally, the fruits of the multi-layered capacity building labour are clear. The enduring presence from 2014 to prior to the Russian invasion of last year has assisted in Ukraine’s defence. The basic measure of effectiveness with a desired end state of a capable and resilient Ukrainian Armed Forces and security sector has been achieved. It is Russia’s ongoing struggle against this capable, determined resistance that will have a deterrent effect. This effect demonstrates part of the utility of capacity building and other activities that fall under the defence engagement concept.
“The vision is to enable the Ukrainians to export parts of the programme and deliver them domestically. This is a key point for capacity building. It should not be entirely transactional from the donor to the partner nations.”
The conflict also raises questions about the effectiveness of the UK’s and NATO’s deterrence posture. Russia was not deterred by economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure or the limited presence in Ukraine of UK, NATO and Western allies in a training capacity. Indeed, the presence of Western force elements could have played into Moscow’s narrative of NATO encroachment and confrontation with Russia. This narrative has been amplified during the conflict with the Kremlin pushing its perception of a battle between Russia and the West both internally and increasingly across the global south. Although the deterrence measures taken prior to the conflict failed on several fronts this should not lead to an abandonment of the concept. What does deter aggression is a capable opposing force able to inflict damage and sustain a defence. In Ukraine, this form of capable deterrence has been further enhanced by the rapid influx of advanced, Western weaponry that has been used to inflict punishment on the attacker. A lesson and deterrent, perhaps, for future aggressors. In a hark back to the proxy wars of the Cold Warera, Ukraine is now awash with a spectrum of capabilities from Western allies.
The UK’s cross-governmental approach and close liaison with international partners such as NATO has partly realised the vision of the Integrated Review for a coherent approach to upstream capacity building to promote stability. It is this, working alongside a united, legitimate political body with popular support, that provides a potential template for future capacity building efforts and highlights the benefits of UK investment after the debacle of withdrawal from Afghanistan. Our continued training engagement through Operation Interflex – the successor to Operation Orbital outlined below – assists in what must be a capability interoperability and integration-atspeed issue for the Ukrainian armed forces.
OP INTERFLEX
British forces left Ukraine only days before the Russian invasion. The following months saw partner nations begin to send equipment to Ukraine and devise other packages of support along several lines of effort. In June 2022, whilst on a visit to Kyiv, then-UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced a major programme to train Ukrainian soldiers. This announcement developed into Operation Interflex – an endeavour that has seen Ukrainian troops trained by the British Army and partners in the United Kingdom, with a stated aim of training 10,000 soldiers every 120 days. The threeweek package covers basic infantry skills such as marksmanship, medical training and cybersecurity and partner nations such as Australia and New Zealand, as well as representatives from members of the Joint Expeditionary Forces, including Estonia and Denmark, have lent expertise to the effort.
An event hosted by the Royal United Services Institute and attended by representatives from Land Operations Command and 5th Battalion, The Rifles in November provided a number of insights on Interflex. After the initial rotations, the course was increased from three to five weeks as a result of the feedback loop received from units returning to Ukraine. The syllabus would be familiar to anyone who has undergone initial military training, although it is possible to see the influence of the specific conflict being prepared for. The course includes teaching on the law of armed conflict, trench warfare, marksmanship, section defence and urban training.
As well as the five-week basic combat course, a second five-week junior leadership course aimed at junior non-commissioned officers and sergeants has been taking place. This concentration added command and leadership training as well as the military decision-making process. Soldiers are given instruction on how to coach marksmanship, complete commanders’ checks, are drilled in simulated mounted tactics and receive counterunmanned aircraft systems training. The vision is to enable the Ukrainians to export parts of the programme and deliver them domestically. This is a key point for capacity building. It should not be entirely transactional from the donor to the partner nations.
Measuring the effect of such efforts can be difficult. Indeed, Western forces have been involved in other capacity building enterprises which have not been successful. Both Iraq and Afghanistan offer examples of vast investment in time and resource where the trained forces have not stood up to scrutiny. Both forces quickly capitulated in the face of Islamic State and the Taliban respectively, leaving Western forces embarrassed. Recent analysis has looked to determine the reasons for this issue. As Robinson argues, the gap between the imported army concepts and recipient culture was vast. The leading power brokers in both states did not want to create the liberal moderate state of Western peace builders’ imagination, and therefore the military transformation was out of step with that of the civilian sector. Ukraine, on the other hand, is more closely aligned with European sensibilities, both geographically and culturally. Indeed, anecdotal evidence from soldiers who have returned to the front after receiving British training is positive. In one example, a subsection of a Ukrainian unit that repulsed a Russian assault was asked by their commander about the source of their tactical knowledge. “This is what we were taught to do in UK training,” came the response. Another front-line Ukrainian commander whose unit took part in the Battle of Kherson stated that “we are delighted with the high level of preparedness of soldiers we are receiving from the United Kingdom who have been trained by Op Interflex”. Of course, it is unlikely that the Ukrainians would publicly admit that the training was not having the desired effect so some of the praise may also have some value in encouraging partners to keep up support. However, capacity building has its limits. There was never a chance that Orbital would put Ukraine on a peer level with Russia and as such, NATO support has been, and – without a finish line in sight – will continue to be necessary going forward. This speaks to the importance of drawing a clear end point to efforts, rather than becoming stuck as permanent trainers to a population for extended periods.
OTHER BEST PRACTICE
The conflict in Ukraine has offered other examples of successful capacity building which might provide a model to build upon. Professional military education is one such area, and one that often does not receive the same level of coverage as combat training. The Defence Education Enhancement Programme is a joint US-NATO endeavour to professionalise the officer and noncommissioned officer corps of partner nations, and first came into being in 2007. It aims to establish “effective, self-sustaining defence institutions” and the Ukrainian chapter became the largest in the world in 2013. These efforts to “help the Ukrainian military transform from a rigid centralised Russianstyle operational decision-making process to one where junior and mid-level leaders are expected to take initiative on the battlefield” have been credited with enabling Ukraine’s forces to operate with an agility and dynamism absent from their adversaries.
Sustainment is another area which has received attention during the conflict. US European Command and the Institute for Security Governance, part of the US Defence Security Cooperation University, began a programme in 2016 to help Ukraine establish effective sustainment planning protocols. US support to Ukraine was such that it overwhelmed the Ukrainian ability to incorporate repair and sustainment into its own organic capability. As a result, the US had to cover this burden, which in turn sapped resource from providing new equipment and support. Among the success stories is the pilot effort to improve domestic sustainment of the high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (or Humvee as it is more commonly nown). Initiatives included servicing centres, developing maintenance manuals and creating a mobile repair unit. Since the invasion in 2022, this issue has become exacerbated with a plethora of weaponry and equipment flooding into Ukraine. Indeed, byone analysis, the Ukrainian armed forces are operating 14 different artillery systems, “each with distinct maintenance and ammunition requirements, creating a tangle of logistics challenges”. This reinforces the importance of having institutions which have the capacity to absorb such increases in burden.
These two examples are useful to stress the importance of institutional capacity building over simply running training courses. Attempting the former is rife with vulnerabilities and each scenario will require a bespoke approach which takes heed of culture, history, and the complexities of organisational change programmes. It is also important to consider civilian elements of capacity building, as it is not purely a military sport. The Polish Medical Mission – a non-governmental organisation – provided bespoke deliveries of medical equipment to 50 hospitals from June to December 2022. Crucially, the logistic chains required to support deliveries to hard-to-reach areas in a conflict zone are now developed and remain established so they can be used going forward. Israel, which has received some criticism for not supporting Ukraine with military equipment, provides another example. A civilian-run field hospital was deployed to Ukraine for six weeks in the spring of 2022. The facility provided battlefield care but also prioritised wider local capacity building, delivering training in a variety of techniques to circa 800 Ukrainian medical personnel. The capacity to treat wounded people and return them to the fight is vital and is an area of expertise in which the British Army is highly skilled and experienced.
CONCLUSION
Upstream capacity building offers a means by which the British Army can contribute to peace and security, advance the vision of Global Britain and make use of its deep and well-developed experience throughout the defence lines of development – from doctrine development, sustainment and combat training to professional education and medical knowledge. The ongoing example of Ukraine shows the utility of long-term commitment to a force to provide vital capacity with which to counter aggression. It has also shown how resource intensive successful capacity building can be, and there is no end in sight to the support currently being given. This may become unpalatable to decision makers as time goes on.
The example of Ukraine also provides a useful distinction from the seemingly failed attempts to build armies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rebuilding military forces and attempting to forge a functioning state with imported idealshas been proven to be a losing mission. Conversely, Ukraine’s cultural similarities and relative stability appear to have afforded the atmosphere necessary for successful capacity building. It is difficult to conclusively prove the correlation/causation link between capacity building activities and the effectiveness of a country’s armed forces but there is clear evidence of an enhancement of Ukraine’s military prowess. Whether attributable in part to multinational efforts or not, there is plenty of progress to be seen when you compare the events of 2014, when a much smaller Russian force was able to achieve its objectives largely unchallenged, to today’s well-orchestrated defence and counter-offensive operations.
William George is the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow at Chatham House, and holds an MA in International Relations. His primary area of research is Russian information warfare.
Patrick Hinton is the Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI. Patrick has an MA in International Relations from the University of Staffordshire and an MBA from the University of Warwick.